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Abstract   
We investigate whether women’s political representation in state legislatures 
improves public provision of antenatal and childhood health services in the 
districts from which they are elected, arguing that the costs of poor services in 
this domain fall disproportionately upon women. Using large representative 
data samples from India and accounting for potential endogeneity of politician 
gender and the sample composition of births, we find that a 10 percentage 
point increase in women’s representation results in a 2.1 percentage point 
reduction in neonatal mortality, and we elucidate mechanisms. Women’s 
                                                 
*Contact: Professor Sonia Bhalotra, Department of Economics, University of 
Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ, UK. Email: 
s.bhalotra@bristol.ac.uk. Professor Irma Clots, Universidad Carlos III de 
Madrid, Departamento de Economía, C/ Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe (Madrid),  
Spain. Email: iclots@eco.uc3m.es, irmaclots@gmail.com. This research was 
done while the first author was at the Universities of Bristol and Oxford. We 
benefited from presenting this paper at the American Economic Association 
meetings, the Workshop on Gender Economics (FEDEA), a 
CEPR/BREAD/AMID conference in London, the NEUDC, the Indian 
Statistical Institute Delhi, the Public Health Foundation Delhi, the University 
of Oxford, NHH Bergen and the University of Goettingen. We would like to 
thank Lakshmi Iyer for providing the data on the gender of state chief 
ministers and to thank Steve Bond, Martin Browning, Lakshmi Iyer, Stephan 
Klasen, Kate Vyborny, and two referees for helpful comments. 
 
 
2 
 
political representation may be an under-utilised tool for addressing health in 
developing countries. 
 
Keywords: political identity, global health, gender, mortality, health, social 
preferences, India. 
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Health and the Political Agency of Women 
 
I. Motivation and Summary 
This paper investigates the political economy of public health 
provision, focusing upon the relevance of political identity and, in particular, 
the gender of politicians. The widespread failure of public health provision in 
developing countries is commanding increasing attention in the global arena 
(Black et al. 2003) and in India (Chaudhury et al. 2006, DasGupta 2007, 
Muralidharan et al. 2011). Poverty is not a compelling explanation for the 
scale of (maternal and) child death given that most deaths can be averted with 
low cost interventions (Cutler et al. 2006, Deaton 2006). The evidence points 
to political failure (Kiefer and Khemani 2003, Besley and Kudamatsu 2006) 
but the idea that public health services may suffer from the under-
representation of women in government has not received dedicated 
consideration. In our sample, in India, 10% of children die before the age of 
one and less than 4% of state legislators are women. We investigate whether 
these phenomena are causally related 
Preference differences between the sexes identified in numerous 
settings suggest that women are more likely than men to (i) invest in children 
and (ii) favour redistribution.
2
 This suggests that women may be more likely to 
                                                 
2 On (i), see Thomas 1990, Thomas and Welch 1991, Hoddinott 1995, Lundberg, Pollak 
and Wales 1997, Case 1998, Svaleryd 2002, Besley and Case 2003). One possible 
explanation of this is paternity uncertainty (Alexander 1974). On (ii), see Besley and Case 
2000, Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001, Edlund and Pande 2002, Edlund, Haider and 
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deliver public health improvements in developing countries because there are 
sharp positive age and income gradients in health and the essential policy 
challenge lies in addressing the early life health and survival of children in 
poor families.
3
 Moreover, the benefits of interventions in this area flow 
differentially to women because they disproportionately bear the costs of weak 
reproductive and child health services. Women carry the burden of high 
fertility and child mortality: they care for the sick, witness their children die, 
have further births, and risk dying in child birth.
4
 In line with our hypothesis, 
the enfranchisement of women in early 20
th
 century America led to a sharp rise 
in state health expenditure and a steep drop in infant mortality (Miller 2008). 
And results of the British Election Survey of 2001 show that the single most 
important concern for men is low taxes while, for women, it is the quality of 
the National Health Service (Campbell 2004).
5
  
We investigate whether women’s political representation in state 
legislatures in India influences policy outcomes for individuals in the districts 
from which they are elected. Data on health outcomes, health-related 
behaviours and village-level access to health facilities for a large 
representative sample of individuals are matched to the gender composition of 
state legislators around the time of their birth and in the district of their birth. 
                                                                                                                                
Pande 2005, Warner and Steel 1999, Washington 2008, Oswald and Powdthavee 2010. 
This has been linked to women being, on average, less likely to pay taxes and more likely 
to receive benefits (e.g. Alessina and La Ferrara 2005). 
3 Early childhood death accounts for 30% of all deaths in poor countries compared with 
1% in richer countries (Cutler et al. 2007). There are vast inequalities in health within 
poor countries and most childhood deaths occur in poor households.  
4 In the sample period, almost one in ten children died in India before the age of one. 
Structural estimates on data from the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh indicate that for 
every neonatal death (which we analyse here), women have an additional 0.37 births 
(Bhalotra and van Soest 2008). Maternal mortality as a fraction of births is estimated at 
0.5% (UNICEF).  
5 At the turn of the century, fertility and infant mortality rates in America were similar to 
those in our estimation sample for India. In Britain in 2001, both were dramatically 
smaller. Even so, most women expect to engage with public health services at least once 
through pregnancy and this makes them heavier users, other conditions equal. The 
greater concern of women for public health in contemporary Britain may also reflect 
their representation of children and of the poor. 
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The main identification challenge is that the gender of a competitively elected 
leader is likely to be correlated with voter preferences and hence endogenous. 
A second potential source of bias is that the composition of births is 
endogenous to the political regime. We address these problems using a fixed 
effects instrumental variables estimator that exploits constituency-level 
information on close elections between men and women on the one hand and 
information on siblings in a large sample survey on the other. We test our 
identifying assumptions.  
Consider the size of the estimated impacts on neonatal and infant 
mortality, which are markers of the state of public health in developing 
countries. We find that a one standard deviation increase in women’s political 
representation in the birth year (and similarly in the two years preceding birth) 
results in a 1.5 percentage point (24%) reduction in neonatal mortality, which 
is a 0.06 standard deviation change. An alternative expression of effect sizes is 
that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of women elected from the 
index district to state assembly seats results in a 2.1 percentage point (33.5%) 
reduction in neonatal mortality. A 10 percentage point increase in women’s 
representation is close to a shift from zero to one woman in the median district 
in our sample, which has nine seats. The estimated changes in neonatal 
mortality drive similarly large impacts on infant mortality. To put the effect 
size in perspective, note that the causal impact of democratization on infant 
mortality in sub-Saharan Africa in the post-Cold War period is estimated to be 
a 1.2 percentage point drop in infant mortality, which is 12% of the sample 
mean (Kudamatsu 2012).  
We find limited evidence of “elitism” amongst women elected to state 
legislatures. For instance, the point estimates suggest larger impacts for low 
caste children and amongst children of families in the middle as compared 
with the top of the wealth distribution. There are no significant differences in 
the impact of women politicians who belong to lower vs higher castes. These 
results are topical given that a bill proposing quotas for women in state 
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assemblies is currently pending in the Indian Parliament, with one of the axis 
of debate being that women elected to state assemblies are unlikely to 
represent the interests of the poor (Rai 2002; section 2 below). 
We show that a number of constituency and candidate characteristics 
are uncorrelated with the gender of the winner in the close election sample and 
the estimates stand up to a battery of checks including variation of the vote 
margin that identifies close elections and controls for party and a polynomial 
in the vote margin. They are robust to a rich set of controls for within-mother 
and district-level unobservable trends, and to three falsifying tests. We report 
several extensions, looking at the impacts of decentralisation, political 
competition, turnout, media activity and party alignment. We find no evidence 
that devolutionary reforms in 1993, by sharing power with district and village 
councils, weakened the influence of women in state assemblies. The relative 
influence of women in state legislatures is greater when the chief minister is a 
woman. However, belonging to the same party as the chief minister does not 
enhance the influence of women legislators, which supports our identification 
of gender as distinct from party effects.
6
  
We are able to identify mechanisms, and this underlines the plausibility 
of our findings. We find that women politicians are more likely to invest in the 
village level public health infrastructure while men appear more likely to 
invest in the financial (and telecommunications) infrastructure. Raising female 
political representation results in substantially improved probabilities of 
attending antenatal care, taking iron supplements during pregnancy, giving 
birth in a government facility as opposed to at home (note: we establish no 
change in the probability of giving birth in a private facility), and early 
initiation of breastfeeding. By analysing outcomes such as breastfeeding that 
are not dependent upon infrastructure and by comparing first with further 
births within mother, we argue that the evidence is also consistent with 
                                                 
6 The point estimates indicate that turnout and newspaper circulation in the regional 
language enhance the policy influence of women while party competition tends to lower 
it but these estimates are imprecise. 
6 
 
politician-led information campaigns. Our finding that the estimated impacts 
are larger for first-births also suggests a role for information as information 
obtained for a first birth tends to persist within mother.  
Our results resonate with a literature which suggests that women 
exhibit a stronger propensity to invest in children and have more progressive 
social preferences than men. Possibly our main contribution is to the literature 
describing persistence of the global disease burden and, in this context, the 
failure of public health delivery. We propose reasons that women will tend to 
have stronger preferences over health provision than men and produce robust 
estimates of causal effects using several large representative samples of data 
from India. Our finding that incremental changes in women’s representation in 
state assemblies have sizeable impacts on infrastructure, behaviour and 
outcomes is of potential policy significance not only in relation to motivating 
quotas but also insofar as it extends our understanding of how improvements 
in public health may be achieved.  
II. Women in Politics: Theoretical Background and Evidence 
In the benchmark model of democracy, characterised by complete 
policy commitment, policy choices reflect voter preferences and are 
independent of legislator identity (Downs 1957). However, more recent citizen 
candidate models admit a role for legislator preferences (Besley and Coate 
1997, Levitt 1996, Osborne and Slivinski 1996). This introduces the 
possibility that women politicians make different policy choices than men but 
this rests upon women having different preferences from men. In this way, this 
paper binds two streams of the literature, one concerned with political identity 
and the other with differences in preferences between the sexes. We have 
identified public health as a domain over which we expect women have 
stronger preferences. Identifying the empirical relevance of preference 
differences and domains in which they are most active is key to informing 
debates over quotas for women in government, debates which refer not only to 
representation but also to principles of fairness and diversity (Squires 1996), 
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but which suffer from a scarcity of causal evidence of the impact of 
representation on policy outcomes.  
Much of the recent evidence in economics on the influence of women 
in government has emerged from India following a constitutional amendment 
which came into force in 1993 following which the federal government 
devolved power to district and village level governments and introduced 
reservations for women at these levels. In particular, it was mandated that a 
third of the seats in every village council and, by random assignment, a third 
of the posts of head of village council be reserved for women. A recent crop of 
studies analyses policy and process in village-level governance after 1993, 
comparing villages in which council headship was reserved for women with 
villages in which it was not (Duflo and Chattopadhyay 2004, Beaman et al. 
2007, 2009, Deininger et al. 2011, Iyer et al. forthcoming). Since every village 
had a third of its seats reserved for women after the amendment, these post-
1993 cross-village comparisons identify the impact of council headship rather 
than women’s representation.7  
Our analysis of women’s representation in state legislative assemblies 
is moot given that a Women's Reservation Bill proposing that a third of seats 
in state assemblies and parliament be reserved for women is currently under 
debate. The Bill was introduced in September 1996 and passed by the Rajya 
Sabha (Upper House) in March 2010 but is currently pending in the Lok Sabha 
(Lower House). The introduction of reservations for women in village councils 
in 1993 is regarded as a victory for India’s women’s movement as it allowed 
the grassroots involvement of village women in village-level development 
programmes. The more limited support for the move to introduce reservations 
in state and national parliaments reflects, in part, a concern that women who 
                                                 
7 An exception is Iyer et al. (2012) who analyse the combined influence of reservation of 
headship and of a third of the seats of the village council for women. Rather than a 
cross-village comparison of local outcomes they study cross-state variation in the 
reporting of crimes against women as a function of variation in the year in which 
different states implemented the 1993 village-level reform.  
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claim those seats will tend to be elite and therefore unlikely to represent the 
interests of the majority of women citizens (Mishra 2000, Rai 2002). As 
indicated in section 1, we effectively test the hypothesis that the policy choices 
of women in state assemblies are detached from the interests of the common 
woman. 
We differ from most previous work in studying women politicians in 
state legislatures rather than village councils, acting as members [of the state 
legislature] rather than as heads [of the village council] and elected against 
men rather than appointed to reserved seats.
8
 Women in India occupy a small 
share of state assembly seats and it is conceivable that incremental changes in 
their share will have limited policy influence even if their headship at the local 
level counts. In contrast to previous studies, we investigate not only the 
composition of village level public goods but also the effectiveness of state 
interventions. We analyse a longer period of India’s democratic history that 
includes pre-1993 data. This allows us to test whether the devolutionary 
reforms in 1993, by sharing power with district and village councils, weakened 
the influence of women in state assemblies. This is the first paper to 
investigate whether women’s say varies with indicators of political 
competition, and with the gender and party-similarity of the state chief 
minister. Alongside a range of indicators of public health, we investigate 
fertility and the sex of births as outcomes. 
Two previous studies investigate the role of women in state 
legislatures. One concludes that raising the share of female politicians results 
in higher education but only in urban areas (Clots-Figueras 2012). The other 
finds improvements in a wider set of policy variables but shows that these 
improvements flow essentially from women who hold seats reserved for the 
                                                 
8  While randomisation of the headship of the village council in India created quasi 
experimental data, a limitation of generalizing results from analysis of reservations is that 
they can have direct effects on policy outcomes by changing the nature of political 
competition (Franceschet et al. 2009). We discuss identification of the influence of 
competitively elected leaders below. 
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lower castes, that is, from “non-elite” women politicians (Clots-Figueras 
2011). However it looks at law, expenditure and infrastructure aggregated to 
the state-level and it may be that the influence of higher caste women is 
apparent at a more disaggregate level, in the allocation of resources towards 
their constituencies. Alternatively, their influence may lie not in expenditure 
and infrastructure but in the effectiveness of provision arising, for example, 
from the conduct of information campaigns. We therefore look at effectiveness 
of politicians at the local level and motivate a focus on public health provision 
as a domain in which gendered preferences may be exhibited and also a 
domain in which the beneficiaries are relatively poor.  
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Health Outcomes and Facilities: We avoid the use of state-level 
health expenditure given that its effectiveness in developing countries at large 
has been debated (Filmer and Pritchett 1999, Filmer, Hammer and Pritchett 
2000). Raising the share of women in US state legislatures has been shown to 
raise state health spending (Rehavi 2007) but, in India, a disproportionate 
share of the health budget is dedicated to (curative) hospital services which are 
less pro-poor than (preventive) public health expenditures (Peters et al., 2002). 
While Indian data suggest some impact of health expenditure on infant 
mortality, this impact is weakest in the most vulnerable groups (Bhalotra 
2007). We select neonatal and infant mortality as indicators of public health 
provision that measure the effectiveness of state intervention, and at a local 
level, namely, the district from which the politician is elected. To investigate 
what it is that women politicians actually do, we investigate the influence of 
politician gender on the village level public health infrastructure. However 
public health facilities in India are often poorly staffed (Das and Hammer 
2007, Banerjee, Deaton and Duflo 2003) and uptake of publicly provided 
services such as immunization low (Banerjee et al. 2011). So we also 
investigate a range of indicators of the utilization of publicly provided 
antenatal and early postnatal care to indicate whether politician gender 
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influences health-seeking behaviour. There is a sharp wealth gradient in all of 
the outcomes.  
Health Data: Individual data on child survival are obtained from 
retrospective fertility histories reported in the second round of the Indian 
National Family Health Survey (NFHS) by a representative sample of ever-
married women aged 15-49 in 1998-99.
9
 This makes it straightforward to 
identify siblings. There is an average of 3.8 births per mother, conditional on 
at least 2. The histories provide information on the year of birth and death for 
births that occur across three decades, so these data can be matched to the time 
variation in the political data. The data indicate the district of current residence 
and the years that the mother has lived in her current location. We drop 
mothers who had births in a location other than the current residence, but we 
investigate this restriction below. To allow for full exposure to neonatal 
[infant] morality risk we exclude children born less than a month [a year] 
before the date of the survey. We also draw from the NFHS information on 
health-seeking behaviours in the four years preceding the survey date and on 
village facilities at the time of the survey. These are defined in the data 
appendix and discussed further in the results section. The state of public health 
is very poor. For instance, in our sample period, 10% of children die before the 
age of one, almost 70% of births occur at home and only 14% of villages have 
a primary health centre. All descriptive statistics are in Tables 1A, 1B, and 1C. 
[Tables 1A, 1B and 1C here] 
Political Structure: India is the largest and oldest democracy in the 
developing world. It has a federal structure in which the constitution devolves 
significant control over their own government to the 28 states and 7 union 
territories, and population health falls under the purview of State Legislative 
Assemblies. States and union territories are divided into single-member 
constituencies in which candidates are elected in first-past-the-post elections. 
                                                 
9 For further information, including sampling design, see IIPS and ORC Macro (2000). 
For a discussion of the potential issues arising with the use of retrospective data, see the 
Data Appendix. 
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The boundaries of assembly constituencies are drawn to make sure that there 
are, as near as practicable, the same number of inhabitants in each 
constituency. Thus, state assemblies vary in size with the state population. 
Districts are an important level of local government between state and village 
governments. Most decisions pertaining to public health provision were made 
at the state level until 1993 (Rao and Singh 1998). Even after 1993, when 
powers over the implementation of developmental projects were devolved to 
the district and village level, state legislators continued to have substantial say 
and to play a potentially important role in negotiation with and coordination 
across layers of local government.  
Electoral Data: We have constituency-level data on the gender and 
votes won by the winner and runner-up for every election to State Legislatures 
in India during 1967-1998. Our sample contains information on 76732 
constituency elections in the 16 larger states. In order to match these data with 
health data, they are aggregated to the district level (see the data appendix). 
Districts have between 1 and 37 electoral constituencies and the median 
district has 9. Elections are routinely every five years but states often hold 
mid-term elections at shorter intervals. The mean proportion of seats in a 
district won by women is 3.6% (s.d. 7.4%). The median is zero and the 75th 
and 90th percentiles are, respectively, 5.5 and 14.3%. So the distribution is 
highly skewed (Figure A1 in the Appendix). At least one woman was elected 
in 26.4% of district-electoral years and in this sub-sample, the share of seats 
held by women is 13.8%. There is an upward trend in the share of seats held 
by women (Figure 1) and substantial differences in both the level and trend by 
state (Figure 2).  
[Figures 1 and 2 here] 
We define close elections as elections in which the winner and the 
runner-up are of opposite gender and the vote margin between them is less 
than 3.5%. Across the sample period, only 7.45% of district-years had at least 
one close election, but they have become more common over time. Fewer than 
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1 in 400 seats had close elections between women and men in the 1960s and 
1970s, and that figure jumped to more than 1 in 100 for the 1980s and 1990s.  
Merged Data: The health data are merged with the political data by 
district and (lagged) birth year to produce a micro panel of births within 
mother nested within a district-year panel. The estimation sample contains 
more than 70000 individual births to some 18000 mothers that occur across 
246 districts (in 16 states) over the 32 year period, 1967-1998.
10
 A non-
parametric (lowess) plot of the relationship between neonatal mortality risk 
and the share of women leaders at the district level shows that the 
unconditional relationship is negative (Figure A2 in the Appendix). We now 
investigate whether a negative relationship persists after allowing for 
endogeneity and heterogeneity. 
IV. Empirical Strategy 
We are interested in the relationship between an individual’s access to 
public health services and the share of women elected to state assemblies from 
the individual’s district of birth. We focus upon antenatal and early postnatal 
services targeted at women and newborns and hence at the gender mix of 
politicians in the year before and the year of birth.  In this section we explain 
how we address the three potential sources of bias that arise. First, women’s 
representation tends to be correlated with voter preferences. Second, the 
composition of births may vary endogenously. Third, there may be district-
year varying changes in other determinants of health that coincide with the 
election of women.  
To address the problem that common unobservables may drive both 
electoral preferences for women and health-related behaviours we instrument 
the overall share of women politicians with the share of women who win in 
close elections against men. Close elections are defined as those in which the 
winner and the runner up are of opposite gender and the margin of victory is 
                                                 
10 The number of election years is 26 and, since different states had elections in different 
years, the estimation sample contains 1826 district* years. 
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small. The premise is that the identity (gender) of the winner of a close 
election is quasi-random. To see this, note that in a first-past-the-post electoral 
system, the probability of being elected is a function of the vote difference 
between the winner and the runner-up and this function has a discontinuity at 
zero. As the vote difference approaches the discontinuity, constituencies in 
which a woman wins by a small vote margin are increasingly similar to 
constituencies in which a man wins by a small margin (Lee 2008, Pettersson-
Lidbom 2001). Since we aggregate to the district level over discontinuities at 
the constituency level, our specification is similar to a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity design (e.g. Angrist and Pischke 2008: chapter 6). We 
investigate robustness of the estimates to controls for varying polynomials in 
the constituency-specific margins of victory or defeat of each man-woman 
close election in the district.  
The identification driving our approach is nicely illustrated in Figure 3, 
which plots the fraction of seats (constituencies) in the district won by female 
politicians against the margin of victory between the female and the male 
candidate (a positive margin means that the woman won). Figure 3A uses all 
the elections between a male and a female politician, while Figure 3B restricts 
the sample to those districts that had a single election between a male and a 
female politician. The data are aggregated into one percentage point bins, as 
suggested by Imbens and Lemieux (2008), and we plot a lowess smoothing 
line on each side of the discontinuity. The size of the jump in Figure 3A 
indicates that a woman winning a close election in a district increases the 
fraction of constituencies in the district won by female politicians by roughly 
10 percentage points. This is what we would expect given that the average 
district has 9-10 constituencies.  
[Figure 3 here] 
Although the gender of the winner in a close election may be considered 
random, the existence of close elections between women and men may not, for 
example, it may depend on the number of female candidates in the district and 
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this, in turn, may be correlated with voter preferences. To allow for this, we 
control for the fraction of seats in the district that had close elections between 
female and male candidates in the first and second stage of the instrumental 
variables procedure. Close elections between women and men have been 
previously used for identification by Rehavi (2007) and Clots-Figueras (2011, 
2012). We investigate the assumptions underlying the use of close elections in 
section 5.2 below, where we also assess the external validity of our estimates. 
Since we focus upon newborns, we need to address a further potential 
source of bias arising from endogenous heterogeneity in the timing of fertility: 
through selection into either conception or foetal survival, the composition of 
live births in the sample may vary systematically with the gender composition 
of politicians.
11
 For instance, some women may be more likely than others to 
consciously advance or defer fertility in response to the policy [political] 
regime. Alternatively, foetal death (whether through miscarriage or (female) 
foeticide), may vary systematically as a function of reproductive health 
facilities and campaigns discouraging foeticide and these facilities and 
campaigns may in turn be influenced by the share of women politicians. If, for 
instance, the incidence of female foeticide declines under women politicians 
then, given that foeticide is more common amongst educated mothers 
(Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010), the composition of (live) births that we observe 
under women politicians will tend to be lower risk than the sample observed 
under male politicians. If we do not control for this, we may attribute what is 
essentially a selection effect to differences in the behavior of female vs male 
politicians. We limit this problem by using mother fixed effects. These will 
purge all fixed mother-level unobservables including the time-invariant 
component of their political preferences and any tendency they may have to 
compensate or reinforce state investments in children (crowding-out or 
                                                 
11 See Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) and Bhalotra (2010) who argue that selection 
may arise from the conscious timing of fertility and the selective survival of the foetus 
respectively. 
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crowding-in). This is a considerable improvement relative to using district 
fixed effects. 
The third potential bias is addressed by controlling for unobservable 
trends. In the specification illustrated below we control for state-specific 
trends but in extensions of this we demonstrate robustness to district-specific 
trends and district by mother-cohort fixed effects. The first set of estimated 
models is 
 
(1) mortalityimdt= αm+t + womendt-1+ 


N
j
jdtj
N
j
jdtjdtj ImFI
1
2
1
1 )(*
 + 
totalclosedt-1+ Ximdt + +Zdtμ +st + εimdt 
(2) womendt= m + t +  womenclosedt + 


N
j
jdt
j
N
j
jdtjdtj ImFI
1
4
1
3 )(*
+totalclose dt +  
+Ximdt+ Zdtπ +st + eimdt 
 
The subscripts denote the individual child i of mother m born in district d (in 
state s) in year t. By construction, mothers do not migrate across districts 
between births (we investigate this restriction in section 5.2). Hence mother 
fixed effects nest (or imply) district fixed effects. Mortality is an indicator for 
the index child dying by the age of one month (neonatal), women is the 
district-level share of state assembly constituencies to which a woman was 
elected in the year before the child was born (we investigate timing below) and 
 is the parameter of interest. The other variables in equation (1), in order, are 
mother and (child) cohort fixed effects, a third-order polynomial (F) in the 
victory margin (m) between the winner and the runner up for every (close or 
non-close) man-woman election j, interacted with Ijdt, an indicator for whether 
such an election exists, totalclose is the fraction of constituencies in the district 
that experienced a close election, X is a vector of child or mother-specific 
controls, Z is a vector of district-year varying controls and  are state-specific 
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trends. We examine sensitivity to the definition of close elections, inclusion of 
victory margins, district trends, flexible trends in mother’s age and cohort, and 
individual controls. Equation (2) represents the first stage of the IV procedure. 
It shows the potentially endogenous regressor, women, regressed upon the 
instrument, womenclose, and the same set of controls. The instrument is the 
fraction of constituencies in the district in which a woman won against a man 
in a close election.  
 The cohort dummies control for aggregate time-variation associated 
with, for example, secular improvements in health technology, episodic shocks 
like famines, floods and epidemics and any aggregate economic or political 
regime changes. The state (and, later, district) specific trends allow for 
regional omitted trends, for example, income or trends in the status of women. 
The district level controls Z include the shares of the population that are 
female, urban and low caste and male and female literacy rates. Controls X 
include dummies for the gender, birth order, rural/urban location, religion, and 
caste of the child and an indicator for whether the child is one of a multiple 
birth.  
 We use a linear model since fixed effects probit estimates are 
inconsistent in short panels (Nickell 1982) and the relevant panel in this case is 
the micro-panel, where T is the number of children per mother. Standard errors 
are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity and clustered at the district-
level since the regressor of interest, women, is entered as a district-level share. 
This allows for correlations at any time and across time within district (e.g. 
Bertrand et al. 2004). It also allows for correlation of the standard errors across 
siblings because, by construction, siblings are all in the same district. 
 In sum, the estimated specification delivers an estimate of the 
difference in mortality risk across children of the same mother born at 
different times and under different political regimes, with the change in 
political regime constructed as a quasi-random assignment of the gender of 
politicians in the district of birth. We investigate the identifying assumptions 
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that underlie the use of close elections. In view of our use of mother fixed 
effects, we check on the further identifying assumption that there are no 
omitted mother-specific trends the effects of which may load onto the variable 
of interest. We conduct a range of sensitivity checks including three sorts of 
falsification exercises and investigate heterogeneity in impact by 
characteristics of the child/mother and political variables including 
competition and decentralisation.  
 We further estimate equations that replace mortality in equation (1) 
with a vector of village public goods on the one hand and a vector of 
individual antenatal and early postnatal health-seeking behaviours on the 
other. We investigate fertility and the sex of births as further outcomes. The 
identification strategies we use to analyse these investments and behaviours 
are similar and are detailed below, alongside the results. 
V. Results 
A. Survival Outcomes 
 Estimates of equations (1) and (2) are in Table 2. Consider effect sizes 
in the richest specification, which appears in column (6). Raising the share of 
seats held by women at the district level (women) by one standard deviation 
(0.0740) is estimated to result in declines in neonatal [infant] mortality of 1.5 
[1.4] percentage points. This is 24[14]% of the mean rate in the sample, which 
is 6.3[9.8]% and it corresponds to a 0.063[0.048] change in the s.d. of neonatal 
[infant] mortality. Since the distribution of women is skewed (Figure A1 in the 
Appendix), we consider the survival improvements brought about by electing 
one additional woman. The median district has nine constituencies and so nine 
seats. As it happens, close to 10% of districts in the sample have exactly nine 
seats and in this set the mean (0.034) and median (0) share of seats held by 
women is very similar to the sample mean (0.036) and median (0). If one 
additional woman wins, the median number of seats goes from 0 to 1 and the 
share from 0 to 1/9=0.11. If we plug this in to the estimated equations, we get 
even larger numbers. The predicted decline in neonatal [infant] mortality is 
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now 2.3 [2.1] percentage points. Later we show that the effects of politician 
gender on infant mortality are entirely determined by its effects on neonatal 
mortality (section 5.3).  
[Table 2 here] 
 Table 2 describes how the estimates for neonatal mortality evolve as 
the specification is enriched to improve identification. The OLS coefficient is 
small and insignificant. There is no significant change in it when the sample is 
restricted to mothers with at least two births in column (2), the sample that will 
be used in the final specification. Controlling for mother fixed effects in the 
OLS specification results in a larger negative coefficient but it remains poorly 
determined. The 2SLS coefficients are larger and, conditional upon mother 
fixed effects, statistically significant. The IV-fixed effects coefficient is not 
significantly different from the IV coefficient (col. 4 v col. 5). Introducing the 
household and district level controls listed in Notes to Table 2 makes no 
significant difference although the coefficient is slightly larger.
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The OLS coefficient may be biased by the endogeneity of voter 
preferences. Our finding that it is biased downwards is consistent with women 
being more likely to be elected in districts with poorer baseline health. The 
inclusion of mother fixed effects implies that results will not reflect fixed 
differences between districts, but it may be that female politicians are elected 
in districts with declining trends in health. The difference between the IV and 
OLS coefficients may also reflect a difference between the local average 
identified off close races and the average effect. How the local and the average 
impacts compare depends upon the underlying theoretical model, and our 
findings appear consistent with a citizen candidate model. If the cost of a close 
race is higher than of a non-close race then a candidate needs a higher payoff 
to play, suggesting that only candidates with far apart preferences will play ( 
                                                 
12 Table 2 reports only the coefficient on the regressor of interest. Appendix Table A6 
reports the full set of coefficients. Given that the effect we find for infant mortality is 
mainly capturing the effect on neonatal mortality, the extensions below will be for 
neonatal mortality. Parallel results for infant mortality are available on request.  
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Rehavi 2007). Another possibility is that women who run in close races 
against men are positively selected on characteristics, having overcome greater 
social barriers to compete on a male-dominated terrain.  
In general IV coefficients will be larger when the variable of interest is 
measured with error but we expect that measurement error in counting women 
winners in Indian elections is small. Indeed if measurement error were 
important then, as this is exacerbated by differencing, we would expect 
attenuation of the coefficient upon introduction of mother fixed effects. 
Instead the coefficient is larger still, possibly indicating that parents reinforce 
endowments in allocations across siblings, consistent with other evidence that 
points in this same direction (Almond and Mazumder 2013).  
The first stage of the 2SLS estimates is also reported in Table 2. The 
instrument is powerful and the share of women who win across all elections 
varies proportionately with the share of women who win in close elections.
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With the share of women winners in close elections constant, the share of all 
women winners is negatively associated with the total share of close elections 
within a district since this now varies only with the share of male winners. The 
coefficient in the reduced form of the equation system (1), (2) is -0.1847 with 
a standard error of 0.070. 
B.  Robustness Checks 
We first outline checks on the close elections assumption (Appendix Tables 
A1-A5) and then discuss robustness of the baseline specification to 
specification checks (Table 3, Appendix Tables A7-A9).  
 The close elections assumption: Following the initial use of the 
close election identification strategy in the context of close elections between 
Democrats and Republicans in the US (Lee 2008), concerns have been raised 
that the outcomes of close elections may be biased in favour of incumbents or 
                                                 
13 The coefficient on the fraction of constituencies won by women in close elections 
against men in Panel A is 0.89, which is not significantly different from 1. But some 
female politicians win in elections that are not close elections against men, some win 
against a man by a large margin and others may win against another woman. 
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in favour of candidates from parties that have strategic control over the 
election process (Snyder 2005, Caughey and Sekhon 2011, Grimmer et al. 
2011). We investigate incumbency and party affiliation in addition to other 
observables but find no evidence of this problem for our sample of close 
elections between men and women in India. A simple regression shows that 
the proportion of women in a district who won in a close election against a 
man is independent of the history of close elections in the district, the history 
of women being elected, the share of seats that each of eight parties contested 
in close elections and a host of district-time varying demographic variables 
(Table A1 in the Appendix). Candidate and constituency characteristics are 
also independent of the gender of the winner in close elections. This includes 
the number of other female candidates in the constituency, whether the winner 
was the incumbent, the number of close elections in the past, the votes 
received by the winner and turnout (Table A2 in the Appendix). These results 
are consistent with the gender of the winner in close elections between men 
and women being random.  
Our estimates rely upon districts that had at least one close election 
between a woman and a man and the share of all births in the sample that 
occur in these districts is 7.45%. In Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix we 
investigate whether districts that had a close election are matched on 
observables to districts that did not. The observables include district 
demographics, the share of villages with hospitals and schools and the share of 
seats won by each gender in elections that were not close (Table A3). The 
mean differences are small but some are significantly different from zero, 
which underlines the importance of our controlling for the fraction of seats in 
the district that had close elections between women and men. The share of 
constituencies won by each of the main political parties in India is not 
significantly different between close and non-close elections (Table A4). We 
nevertheless control in the regressions for the district-level seat shares of each 
of seven parties for the reason stated in the next section. 
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 Electoral variables: Since regression discontinuity underlies the 
close election IV approach, we investigate parameterisation of the vote margin 
between the winner and runner up. The coefficient of interest is not 
significantly altered by dropping these controls or restricting the order of the 
polynomial (Table 3, columns 1-3). The premise that the gender of the leader 
is random in a close election only holds in a small window around the point 
where the vote margin between the winner and the runner up is zero, but there 
is an efficiency-robustness trade off in deciding the width of the window. We 
therefore investigate the chosen threshold for identification of close elections, 
varying this downwards and upwards from the selected 3.5% to include the 
range 2 to 4%. There is no significant change in the coefficient on women 
(columns 4-7). We restricted the sample to district-year observations (41% of 
the baseline sample) in which there was at least one election between a man 
and a woman as these are the observations upon which identification rests. 
This makes no significant difference (col. 8).
14
  
[Table 3 here] 
 To control for the possibility that certain political parties 
strategically appoint women candidates more than others (Rai 2002), we 
condition upon the district share of seats occupied by each of seven parties.
15
 
We also control for the district share of state assembly seats reserved for low 
caste candidates to allow for the possibility that women and men compete 
differently for these seats. These changes do not alter the coefficient of interest 
(Table 3, panel B, column 1). Using the outer fence of the interquartile range, 
we removed outliers in women’s representation above the 75th percentile. This 
                                                 
14 In principle we could implement a sharp regression discontinuity using districts in 
which there was exactly one election between a man and a woman but in practice we do 
not have enough within-mother variation in this. 
15 Following Besley and Burgess (2002), seven party groups are constructed: Congress, 
Hard Left, Soft Left, Janata, Hindu, Regional parties, and Independents coupled with 
other small parties (these are the parties in A4 where Independent and other are 
separated; also see the data appendix). 
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amounts to removing the 1.45% of observations with women greater than 28%. 
The estimates are robust to this (Table 3, panel B, column 2). 
 Within-mother trends: In a model with mother fixed effects, 
identification of calendar time effects can only come from mothers having 
children at different moments in time, and there is necessarily a trend in birth 
order and the mother’s age at birth between siblings. This makes it important 
to isolate the effects of time-variation in women’s political representation from 
the effects of birth-order and the age of the mother at each birth. We already 
control flexibly for birth order, using dummies for each order. We now 
introduce age at birth dummies and more flexible controls for mother’s age at 
birth, namely, dummies for mother’s cohort*child cohort (columns 3-4, Table 
3: panel B). For a given year of birth of the mother, the year of birth of the 
child implies the age of the mother at birth. Since the estimated equations 
already include fixed effects for the child’s birth year, this is equivalent to 
controlling for fixed effects in the age of the mother at birth and allowing their 
impact to vary by the birth cohort of the mother. Controls for mother’s age at 
birth are also important in correcting for the fact that retrospective fertility 
(and mortality) data grow increasingly unrepresentative of mother’s age as we 
go further back in time (Rindfuss et al. 1982). See the data appendix. 
Other unobserved trends: We investigated controls for unobservable 
trends in general. The estimates in Table 2 are conditional upon state linear 
trends. We now include, in sequence, state-specific quadratic trends, 
state*year dummies, district-specific trends and district*mother’s cohort 
dummies (columns 5-8, panel B). The last is important because a potential 
problem with using only district fixed effects is that different cohorts of 
mothers in different districts, having been exposed to different income and 
health conditions, are more or less likely to have children with lower survival 
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chances.
16
 Again, as we condition upon fixed effects for the child’s birth year, 
this effectively allows for district-varying trends in the age of the mother at 
birth. The estimates are robust to these fairly powerful controls.  
Lags: Since interventions motivated by politicians may operate with a 
lag, we investigated lags as far back as the third year before birth; see Table 4. 
Some persistence is built in by virtue of politicians typically holding office for 
5 years, as then politicians elected 2 years before a child is born will on 
average be in power the year before and the year the child is born.
17
 We find 
that the gender composition of politicians in the two years before birth and in 
the birth year (t-2, t-1, t) has a similar sized significant coefficient but the 
share of women in power more than two years before the index birth has no 
impact. In India most women have a birth within two years of marriage, so this 
particular pattern of fading is consistent with politicians targeting women at 
risk of conception (newly married women) with interventions such as prenatal 
care information, immunization or nutrition and this showing an impact on 
offspring born one or two years later.  
[Table 4 here] 
Placebos: To further mitigate concerns that we are capturing omitted 
trends, we implemented placebos. First, we modelled the neonatal mortality 
risk of cohorts born in t as a function of future politician gender (t+1 to t+9); 
these coefficients are all essentially zero (Table 4). Second, we used the 
sample of mothers that moved to the current location a year or more after the 
birth of their youngest child so their births are effectively matched to 
politicians that they were never exposed to. Again, the coefficient on women is 
small and insignificant (Table A8 column 1). However, there is a problem 
with this test which is that we do not know whether the previous location was 
                                                 
16 See Bhalotra (2010) on the importance of mother’s birth year conditions for offspring 
health and see Kudamatsu (2012) for a related discussion in the context of mother fixed 
effects estimation of the impact of democratization on mortality. 
17 Politicians in power at t-5 will tend to exit before or in the birth year t, politicians in 
power in t-4 will tend to exit before or in t+1, and so on. 
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in the same district or in a different one, and this adds noise to the estimates. A 
third placebo was run using as an outcome, the height of mothers. Since adult 
height is largely determined in early childhood (Bozzoli et al. 2009), we 
expect politicians in the birth year of the child to have no impact on the height 
of the mother, and this is what we see (Table A9 in the Appendix).  
Migration: The estimates in Table 2 are on the sample of mothers that 
have had all their births in their current place of residence. This is a strong 
restriction. We relax it to include only children who were born in the current 
place of residence of the mother. In order to investigate the extent of any 
selectivity in migration, we also estimate the model with no restrictions. The 
coefficient of interest grows smaller as we successively lift restrictions on the 
sample but it remains significant and within two standard errors of the baseline 
coefficient (Table A8 in the Appendix).
18
 This puts aside any concern that our 
selection of a non-migrant mother sample is either creating a bias or producing 
results that may be altogether unrepresentative.  
C. Extensions 
The results discussed here are displayed in Tables 5 and 6. 
 Birth order: If one of the ways that women politicians influence 
health outomes is through information campaigns then we may expect 
exposure to women politicians to have a larger impact on outcomes for first 
births. This is what we find (col. 1-2, Table 5). Aizer and Currie (2004) 
adduce a similar distinction between first and higher order births in attempting 
to isolate the role of information diffusion in women’s social networks. In 
principle, facilities constructed around the birth of a first child will also tend to 
persist within mother so that they are available to her further births even if the 
share of women in government has changed. However, there is widespread 
absenteeism of medical practitioners from public health facilities 
                                                 
18  The smaller coefficients are consistent with migrant women and children being 
matched in the data to politicians who had no influence on them because at least some 
of the migrants (those who moved district) had moved away from their domain. 
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(Muralidharan et al. 2011) so, in contrast to information, the effective 
availability of facilities will tend to vary within mother.  
[Table 5 here] 
Heterogeneity in household status: Since child mortality is 
concentrated amongst the poor, our finding of impacts of politician gender on 
mortality establish the progressiveness of women in state assemblies, in 
contradiction with debates that currently block the institution of quotas for 
women at this level (see section 2). We investigated this further by allowing 
the effects of politician gender to differ by the caste, wealth and rural/urban 
location of the family (Table 5). The coefficients are larger for lower castes, 
consistent with their greater “treatability”. They exhibit an inverted U-shape in 
wealth, with the smallest effects apparent for the poorest 20% of households. 
A likely explanation of this is that the productivity of public intervention is 
contingent upon private inputs and that women in the poorest households are 
harder to “treat” because they have lower stocks of health before birth or 
because they are less likely to take up publicly provided prenatal care. It may 
also be that wealth is correlated with education which, in turn, is correlated 
with preferences for health and with the ability to access and process relevant 
information.
19
 We also investigated differences by the caste of politicians. We 
find no difference in impact: the coefficients differ by about half a standard 
error (Table A8).
20
  
Gender-specific impacts: Earlier studies suggest that as women’s 
power in decision making within the household increases marginal gains for 
girls exceed those for boys (e.g. Duflo 2003, Thomas 1990). So, if politician 
                                                 
19 The rates of of neonatal and infant mortality in the higher status groups are not small. 
In the high caste group, the means are close to 5.2 and 8.1 per cent and in the top-40% 
of the wealth distribution they are 4.9 and 7.6 per cent.  
20 This result stands in contrast to Clots-Figueras (2011) who finds that re-distributive 
policy choices are driven by low caste women (see section 1 above). The difference may 
arise from our focus upon reproductive and child health (which women of all social 
groups may be motivated to improve- refer Campbell 2004 cited in section 1) but our 
results are not strictly comparable since we analyse individual outcomes while the earlier 
study analyses state-level aggregates. 
26 
 
identity influences policy outcomes then it is plausible that women politicians 
make a larger difference for girls, for example, by campaigning against son 
preference. So we investigated differences by child gender (Table 5). Using 
the baseline specification, we find slightly larger point estimates for boys, but 
the difference is not statistically significant. We probed this result by including 
in the model proxies for son preference. First, we include a dummy for the sex 
of the first-born child as previous research shows that this is quasi-random, 
and has a discernible impact on the tendency for parents to exercise son 
preference (e.g. Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010). The coefficient for girls is now 
much larger than that for boys and statistically significant, in favour of our 
motivating hypothesis. However it remains insignificantly different form the 
coefficient for boys. We also display results using controls for the sex 
composition of the entire sibship surviving to the birth of the index child (for 
instance, one boy, one girl, a girl and a boy, and so on). The results are similar 
to those for the more parsimonious indicator. Note that these estimates are for 
the sample of children of second or higher birth order. Since controlling for 
the exercise of son preference does raise the point estimate for girls, we re-ran 
the baseline model which pools gender (Table 2 column 6) with these controls. 
The point estimate increases to -0.23 and -0.24 respectively which is 
insignificantly different from the baseline -0.21.  
Pre/post devolution: The 1993 Constitutional Amendment described 
in section 2 devolved control over the implementation of development 
programmes to the panchayat level and this included aspects of health 
provision such as drinking water and immunization delivered through the 
Integrated Child Development Services programme. We therefore allow for a 
weakening of the influence of politicians in state assemblies post-devolution. 
The estimated effect is 10% larger (in absolute value) after 1993 but not 
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significantly different (col. 1, Table 6).
21
 So women’s political representation 
at the state level mattered through the three decades in our sample and their 
power was not substantially eroded upon the empowerment of village 
councils. 
[Table 6 here] 
Heterogeneity by political variables: Previous work has shown that 
political competition disciplines politicians, making them more responsive to 
the needs of citizens (Besley and Burgess 2002) but there is no evidence of 
whether there is any effective interaction between political competition and 
political identity. If male and female politicians were perfect substitutes then 
we would expect to observe better policy outcomes in areas with strong 
political competition but not as a function of the gender of the leader. 
However if men and women having “separate spheres” of influence driven by 
their different preferences, competition may enhance domain-specific gender 
differences in policy outcomes.
22
 To investigate this, we interact party 
competition with the share of women politicians. As in Besley and Burgess 
2002, we also interact turnout and newspaper circulation with the share of 
women politicians. The interaction terms are poorly determined but the point 
estimates are sizeable (Table 6). They indicate that turnout and news 
circulation (especially in the regional language- as also found in Besley and 
Burgess 2002) tend to enhance the policy influence of women, while party 
competition tends to lower it.  
We also investigated the relevance of the gender and party of the chief 
minister to allow, for instance, that legislators are more likely to receive funds 
                                                 
21 Followng Iyer et al. (2012), we created a post-reservation dummy that varies at the 
state*year level reflecting the state-specific implementation of the village level reform. 
Interactions with this dummy are similarly insignificant. 
22 There are other possibilities. If women’s preferences for health are a “luxury”, they 
may be overridden in competitive conditions. If women are marginal voters, women’s 
preferences may hold greater sway under competition. If, as lay evidence suggests, 
women politicians receive more newspaper coverage than their male counterparts then 
the discipline flowing from increased newspaper circulation may result in greater 
effectiveness amongst women relative to men in government. 
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for their constituencies or have their voice heard if their preferences are more 
closely aligned with those of the chief minister. We find that belonging to the 
chief minister’s party does not alter the impact of women legislators. However 
when the chief minister is a woman, there is a large and significant increase in 
the effectiveness of women legislators (Table 6). We conducted a further 
interaction (not shown) with political parties classified as left and right leaning 
and other, but could identify no significant difference in the effectiveness of 
women by their party affiliation. These results underline that we identify 
gender rather than party effects. 
 Post-neonatal mortality: We estimated the model for post-neonatal 
mortality and found no effects of politician gender (Table A10 in the 
Appendix).
23
 The most likely explanation of this is that the post-neonatal 
mortality estimates are biased by endogenous selection into post-neonatal 
exposure to mortality risk- children only enter this sample if they have 
survived the neonatal period, and we have seen that neonatal survival is 
dependent upon politician gender. However the estimates for neonatal and 
infant mortality are unbiased (the selection issue does not arise since they take 
all children exposed from birth). The fact that the neonatal and infant mortality 
estimates are of similar size suggests that reductions in neonatal mortality 
account for almost all of the infant mortality reduction flowing from increases 
in women’s representation.  
This is consistent with the tighter identification of neonatal mortality 
with public health investments in women (maternal health, breastfeeding, 
                                                 
23 Mortality in the first month of life is neonatal and between the second and twelfth 
month is post-neonatal. Infant mortality is the sum of these. Mortality risk declines 
sharply with age, and neonatal mortality contributes two-thirds of infant deaths. 
Amongst children who died before the age of 5 in our sample, 50% died before the age 
of one month (neonatal), 29% between one month and one year (post-neonatal infant) 
and the remaining 21% of deaths occurred between the ages of one and five years. The 
risk of death for children who survive to the age of five is considerably smaller. Since the 
presence of women politicians has a mortality-deterring effect, survivors at the margin 
are negatively selected (see for instance, Bozzoli et al. (2009) on the relative roles of 
selection and “treatment”). 
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place of delivery). As children age into the post-neonatal period, they are 
exposed to a more diverse set of household-level influences including income, 
nutrition and aspects of parenting behaviour like hygiene. It becomes harder to 
attribute improvements in post-neonatal health to public provision and this 
presumably weakens politician incentives. Also, there is growing evidence that 
health interventions are more productive the earlier in childhood they are made 
(Almond and Currie 2012, Bhalotra and Venkataramani 2013): this too 
rationalizes investments that improve health in the first month (neonatal) as 
more productive than investments that improve health after (post-neonatal).
24
  
 Fertility: By virtue of using mother fixed effects we have already 
accounted for endogenous variation in the composition of births. We now 
investigate the impact of politician gender on the probability that a child is 
born, and the sex of the child conditional upon birth, instrumenting with the 
outcome of close elections as before. As we have the entire fertility history of 
each mother, we expanded the data so that for every woman there is an 
observation for every year in which she is exposed to the risk of birth (starting 
with her age at marriage and stopping at age 49 or the date of interview). We 
find no significant change in the probability of a birth. 
 Having established that the probability of a further birth (conditional 
upon the last observed) is not endogenous, we can proceed to estimate child 
sex conditional upon birth. We find that the probability that a birth is female is 
increasing in the share of women politicians (Appendix Table A12). A ready 
explanation of this would be that women politicians have been more 
committed to controlling female feticide, although we were unable to nail this 
down.
25
 Note that to the extent that women politicians lower female feticide 
                                                 
24 We also investigated under-5 mortality and mortality rates up until age 14 (Table A11). 
The coefficients are consistently negative but statistically insignificant. The selection and 
attribution arguments above apply a fortiori here.  
25 To test this hypothesis, we divided the sample at 1985, because ultrasound scanners 
started to be imported in 1987 and thereafter widely used for prenatal sex detection and 
it is only after the mid-80s that there is a significant trend departure of the sex ratio at 
birth from the biologically normal level (Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010). Our expectation 
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this will create a mechanical increase in fertility which may be balancing out a 
decline in fertility flowing from the decline in neonatal mortality induced by 
raising women’s representation. 
VI. Channels 
In this section we investigate the mechanisms underlying our finding that 
neonatal mortality responds to female political representation. We analyse the 
influence of women’s representaton on a range of indicators of antenatal and 
postnatal care at the mother level and health infrastructure at the village level. 
A. Individual Indicators of Antenatal and Postnatal Care 
We investigated prenatal and early postnatal health-seeking behaviours 
that are known to impact upon early life mortality.
26
 These data are available 
for births that occur in the four years preceding the survey date (1994/5-
1998/9). There are siblings in this sample (for 15.3% of mothers) but they are 
characterised by short intervening birth intervals and given the evidence that a 
short preceding birth interval compromises the health of a child (e.g. Bhalotra 
and van Soest 2008), this is a selected sample. So, while we use the close 
elections instrument as before, instead of mother fixed effects, we use fixed 
effects for finely defined mother-groups, an approach similar to that taken in 
Kudamatsu (2012). We construct fixed effects for groups defined on a 
multidimensional space of mother traits, namely height (above/below mean), 
education (above/below primary), caste (SC, ST, OBC or high caste), 
urban/rural location and the birth year of the mother
27
 and include these along 
                                                                                                                                
was that we would see a positive impact of female political representation on the female-
male ratio at birth after and only after 1985. However the post-85 coefficients are 
imprecise and we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are equal before and after 1985.  
26 Since the samples we use for estimation of equations for survival and for health inputs 
are constrained to be different, we cannot conduct an accounting exercise measuring the 
contributions of the inputs to neonatal mortality but the inputs we consider exhibit the 
expected correlations with neonatal and infant survival.  
27 This generates about 3000 fixed effects in a sample of just under 19000 mothers. 
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with district fixed effects. The estimated equation system otherwise looks 
similar to (1) and (2).
28
 
The results are in Table 7 and the mean and s.d. of each dependent 
variable is in Table 1A. As in Table 2, OLS estimates (not shown) are smaller 
than the IV estimates and tend to be insignificant. The table displays 2SLS 
estimates with and without the quasi- mother fixed effects. Here we discuss 
the richer specification and present effects flowing from a 10 percentage point 
increase in women’s representation which, we explained above, is the 
approximate change in share associated with moving the number of women 
politicians elected in the median district from 0 to 1.  
[Table 7 here] 
Antenatal care, iron and tetanus: The Indian government defines a 
complete course of antenatal care as including at least three antenatal visits, a 
three -month supply of iron tablets and two tetanus injections. Only 37% of 
women in our sample achieve a complete course. We find that women’s 
political representation increases the number of antenatal visits a woman 
makes by 0.28, which is 12% of the mean. It raises the probability that iron 
supplements are taken by about 10 percentage points, relative to a mean of 
57%. This is important given the high prevalence of anemia amongst Indian 
mothers (NFHS data) and the fact that it is a risk factor for low birth weight 
offspring and child survival (Bhalotra and Rawlings (2011). The probability 
that a woman has at least one tetanus injection during pregnancy (which is 
important in lowering the risk of neonatal tetanus) is increasing in women but 
not significantly.  
Breastfeeding: Women’s political representation raises the probability 
of early breastfeeding by 13.4 percentage points, which is a 28% increase. 
Breastfeeding has been shown to influence the cognitive and emotional 
development of children (Del Bono and Rabe 2012). Although the vast 
                                                 
28 The samples used in this and the following section are different from the samples used 
to analyse mortality. We have checked that the first-stage is still very powerful; F-
statistics and reduced form equations available on request. 
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majority of Indian women breastfeed and 77% of children are being breastfed 
at 20-23 months (UNICEF indicators), there are cultural inhibitions to 
breastfeeding immediately after birth and only 48% of Indian women in our 
sample initiate breastfeeding in the first 24 hours. This is when the benefits of 
breastfeeding are greatest, lowering the risk of contracting infectious diseases 
such as diarrhoea and pneumonia and, thereby, lowering neonatal mortality 
risk (Jones et al. 2003).   
Place of birth: Some 69% of births to Indian women in our sample 
occur at home, while the remaining 31% are distributed equally between 
public and private facilities.
29
 Since home births are typically unattended by 
professionals, they generate neonatal survival risks that can be averted in the 
presence of birth attendants trained in the management of sepsis (septicaemia, 
meningitis, pneumonia); see Bang et al. (1999). We find that a 10 percentage 
point increase in women’s political representation lowers home deliveries by 
8.8 percentage points. Moreover, there is evidence that this represents a shift 
of births into government hospitals: the same increase in women raises the 
probability of giving birth in a government facility by 11 percentage points 
while there is no significant change in the probability of giving birth in a 
private facility. Contrast this with the impact of a 10% increase in state 
income: this similarly lowers home deliveries (by a more modest 1.1 
percentage points) but this arises entirely from a shift towards private sector 
deliveries; there is no change in the share of births in government hospitals 
(Bhalotra 2010). This suggests that putting women at the helm leads to 
improved access to government hospitals, consistent with the results in the 
next section.  
B. Village Public Goods 
We now investigate how women’s political representation influences 
tangible supply-side investments. For this we use the under-used village 
                                                 
29 The share of home births is higher in rural areas, at 78%, compared with 33% in urban 
areas. The share of the residual births in public and private facilities is similar in rural and 
urban areas. 
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facilities survey of the NFHS to look at rural infrastructure choices. Facility is 
an indicator for a specified facility in village v in district d in year t. 
Instrumenting for the district share of women as before, we estimate this linear 
equation system using 2SLS- 
 
(3) facilityvdt= αd +t + womendt-1+ 


N
j
jdtj
N
j
jdtjdtj ImFI
1
2
1
1 )(*
 + totalclosedt-
1+ Zdtμ + εimdt 
(4) womendt= d + t + womenclosedt + 


N
j
jdtj
N
j
jdtjdtj ImFI
1
2
1
1 )(*
+totalclose dt + Zdtπ + eimdt 
The estimation sample contains 1591 villages (in the 246 districts), 76% of 
which are surveyed in 1998 and the rest in 1997.
30
 As in the baseline 
specification for mortality, women is measured in the year before birth. We 
find that village public facilities vary significantly with the share of women 
politicians in the district in which the village lies (Table 8). The estimates are 
sharp and consistent across categories. A 10 percentage point increase in 
women raises the probability that the village has a primary health centre, a 
community health centre, a government dispensary and a government hospital 
by 0.22, 0.19, 0.18 and 0.057 respectively.  
[Table 8 here] 
With a view to identifying the sorts of village infrastructure that male 
politicians are more likely to provide, we ran the regressions reported in the 
lower panel of Table 8. A 10 percentage point increase in the share of women 
politicians (which decreases the share of male politicians) significantly lowers 
the probability that the village has a bank. We also observe sizeable negative 
coefficients on indicators for post offices and telephone facilities, although 
                                                 
30  The reported results are conditional upon year and district fixed effects but the 
coefficient of interest is insensitive to dropping the district effects. 
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these are poorly determined.
31
 In sum, the evidence suggests that women 
politicians are significantly more likely to invest in the public health 
infrastructure while men are more likely to invest in the financial and 
telecommunications infrastructure. This defends our initial hypothesis. While 
we control for voter (and mother) characteristics we are unable to control for 
politician characteristics. Therefore some part of the relationships that we 
identify may flow from women who win in close [political] races against men 
being positively selected. However our finding that women favour health over 
financial infrastructure suggests that preferences do play a role.  
C. Discussion 
We have identified significant impacts of women’s political representation on 
a range of indicators of prenatal care, immunization, place of birth and 
breastfeeding, and on different dimensions of the village-level health 
infrastructure. This indicates the sorts of things that politicians do towards 
improving public health services, suggesting the mechanisms underlying our 
finding that childhood mortality rates respond to women’s representation. 
We argue that the improvements in health seeking behaviours are 
consistent with both infrastructure and information improvements. An 
advantage of studying outcomes (does a child survive, does a mother receive 
iron supplements, etc.) rather than direct inputs such as infrastructure or 
expenditure is not only that they reflect the effectiveness of inputs but also that 
they capture complementary policy influences including information 
campaigns. Information is important in the health domain, for example, Miller 
(2008) finds that door to door campaigns advocating home hygiene played a 
critical role in the steep decline in infant mortality in American history, and 
the uptake of publicly provided health services in India appears to be limited 
                                                 
31 So as to investigate the impact of these policy choices on state income, we used state-
level panel data, instrumenting with close elections. We find no impact of the share of 
women in state assemblies on state income, by which measure it would appear that 
raising the political representation of women is a cost-effective way of improving public 
health. 
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because people do not fully recognise the benefits (Banerjee et al. 2011). 
Information may act in either of two ways: to encourage the uptake of public 
services (such as antenatal care), or to encourage private inputs (such as 
breastfeeding). Since breastfeeding does not require public infrastructure, the 
identified impact of women’s representation on breastfeeding directly 
indicates a role for information campaigns. Also, the survey data we use asked 
women what inhibited them in making antenatal care visits and as many as 
60% said that they did not think it was necessary, which suggests the potential 
for information campaigns to generate large improvements in the use of 
antenatal care.
32
 As discussed in section 5.3, our finding that the largest impact 
of women’s representation is on the first birth of a mother is also consistent 
with a role for information. 
Although it is useful to look at timing, we cannot discriminate between 
information and infrastructure mechanisms based upon timing alone. While 
building new facilities may take more than a year, it is often the case in rural 
India that an existing building is brought into use so that in principle 
infrastructure can be raised within the space of a year. Moreover, politicians 
can act fairly rapidly to influence staffing and supplies in facilities or to 
discourage absenteeism among health providers (see Chaudhury et al. 2006, 
Muralidharan et al. 2011) by improving monitoring and incentives. In these 
ways politicians may improve the effectiveness of facilities (and hence 
mortality rates) without any construction of infrastructure.
33
 
  It is difficult to specify the trade-off involved in (randomly) replacing 
a woman with a man in political office without having a full specification of 
the influence of each on the entire portfolio of policies, but we noted earlier 
                                                 
32  Access to publicly provided care is clearly relevant too since the next highest 
frequency, 16%, was recorded for it costing too much. Only 3.5% said it was too 
inconvenient or too far and 1.6% said it was because a health worker did not visit. 
33 There may be complementarities in the outcomes we look at and between provision of 
facilities and information, for example, mothers who give birth in a facility rather than at 
home are more likely to receive information and encouragement to initiate breastfeeding 
soon after birth.  
36 
 
that raising the share of women relative to men leads to more public health 
infrastructure and less rural banking infrastructure. The premise for favouring 
an increase in women’s political participation must be that this balances the 
representation of women’s interests against those of men. 
VII. Conclusions 
We investigated whether women politicians invest more in antenatal care and 
early child health because women incur the costs of reproduction and 
replacement fertility and they make greater investments in the early life health 
of their offspring. We identify significant causal impacts of women’s political 
representation on neonatal survival, uptake of reproductive and postnatal care, 
and the village level public health infrastructure. The estimated impacts are 
large, suggesting that raising women’s political representation may be an 
effective and novel way of improving public health delivery in developing 
countries. Women’s representation at the state level is a live issue in the Indian 
Parliament today and quotas for women in government have been established 
in more than 100 countries in the last 15 years (Dahlerup and Francisco 2005). 
Our findings are relevant to debates concerning political reservations, 
especially in view of recent evidence that women holding office paves the way 
for competitively determined participation of women in politics (Beaman et al. 
2009, Bhavnani 2009, Deininger et al. 2011, Casas-Arce and Saiz 2011, 
Bhalotra, Clots and Iyer 2013).   
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Figure 1: Female Political Representation: All India
Figure 2: Female Political Representation and Neonatal Mortality by State
Figure 3: First Stage Illustration.
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We plot the fraction of seats won by female politicians against the margin of victory in elections
between women and men. Figure 3A uses all the elections between a male and a female
politicians, while Figure 3B restricts the sample to those districts that had a single election
between a male and a female politicians.
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TABLE 1A: DESCRIPTIVES
Unit of Observation: Individual (child), cohorts 1968-1999 in 246 districts
mean sd
Neonatal mortality 0.0627 0.2423
Infant mortality 0.0980 0.2973
Birth order 2.7561 1.8099
Multiple birth 0.0138 0.1166
Girl 0.4770 0.4995
Scheduled Caste (SC) 0.1959 0.3969
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 0.1080 0.3104
Muslim 0.1070 0.3092
Christian 0.0113 0.1057
Other religion 0.0332 0.1791
Rural 0.7816 0.4131
Age of the mother at birth 22.7412 5.0420
Observations 75339
Unit of Observation: Individual (child) in the four years before the survey date (1998/9) mean sd
Number of antenatal visits 2.3190 2.4403
Delivery at home 0.6920 0.4617
Delivery in a government institution 0.1618 0.3683
Delivery in a private institution 0.1462 0.3533
Breastfed in the first 24 hours 0.4816 0.4997
Took iron and folic acid supplements during pregnancy 0.5714 0.4949
Received a tetanus injection during pregnancy 0.7361 0.4408
Observations 8853
Notes: National Family Health Survey, Round 2 (1998/0), summary statistics for estimation samples. The sample used to estimate childhood mortality outcomes consists of 75339 children born
in 1968-1999 across 246 districts. The sample used to estimate health-seeking behaviours consists of 8853 children born in the four years before the survey date. "s.d." is standard deviation.
TABLE 1B: DESCRIPTIVES
Unit of Observation: District in an electoral year , elections between 1967-1998 in 246 districts
mean sd
Proportion of seats won by women (women ) 0.0364 0.0740
Proportion of districts that had at least one woman politician 0.2640 0.4409
Proportion of seats that had close elections between women and men, close: 3.5% margin (totalclose ) 0.0084 0.0333
Proportion of districts that had at least one election between a woman and a man 0.4025 0.4905
Proportion of districts that had at least one close election between a woman and a man (3.5%) 0.0745 0.2626
Proportion of seats  won by women in close elections against men (3.5%) (womenclose ) 0.0041 0.0227
Proportion of districts that had at least one woman politician who won in a close election against a man (3.5%) 0.0383 0.1921
Dummy for the first  election between a woman and a man (I_j )* 0.4025 0.4905
Dummy for the second  election between a woman and a man 0.1292 0.3356
Dummy for the third  election between a woman and a man 0.0389 0.1934
Dummy for the fourth  election between a woman and a man 0.0071 0.0841
Dummy for the fifth  election between a woman and a man 0.0044 0.0661
Dummy for the sixth  election between a woman and a man 0.0011 0.0331
Vote margin for the first  election between a woman and a man (m_j )** 0.0142 0.1820
Vote margin for the second  election between a woman and a man 0.0307 0.2499
Vote margin for the third  election between a woman and a man 0.0024 0.3002
Vote margin for the fourth  election between a woman and a man 0.0115 0.3105
Vote margin for the fifth  election between a woman and a man -0.0241 0.3827
Vote margin for the sixth  election between a woman and a man 0.0092 0.4649
Proportion of seats reserved for SC/ST candidates 0.2366 0.1785
Proportion of seats won by Congress parties 0.4519 0.3317
Proportion of seats won by Hard Left parties 0.0589 0.1512
Proportion of seats won by Soft Left parties 0.0231 0.0901
Proportion of seats won by Janata parties 0.1661 0.2727
Proportion of seats won by Hindu  parties 0.1280 0.2290
Proportion of seats won by Regional parties 0.0772 0.2027
Female literacy rate 0.2844 0.1720
Male literacy rate 0.5352 0.1559
Proportion of SC/STs 0.2524 0.1344
Proportion of urban population 0.2041 0.1409
Proportion of female population 0.4811 0.0167
Women belonging to the same party of the Chief Minister 0.0146 0.0505
Women belonging to other parties 0.0218 0.0570
Political Competion Index (Besley & Burgess) -0.4446 0.2105
Turnout rate 59.1858 9.5442
Female turnout rate 53.6500 11.5700
Female to male turnout ratio 0.8387 0.0876
Newspaper circulation (Besley & Burgess) 0.0599 0.0400
Newspaper circulation (Besley & Burgess) English 0.0085 0.0141
Newspaper circulation (Besley & Burgess) Hindi 0.0234 0.0251
Newspaper circulation (Besley & Burgess) Regional languages 0.0519 0.0342
Whether state Chief Minister is a woman 0.0356 0.1353
Observations 1826
Notes: Electoral data from the Election Commission of India obtained at the constituency level and aggregated to the district level. Summary statistics for the estimation sample.
Individual health outcomes are matched to politician gender in their district of birth in the year before their birth, hence the one year difference in the year-range between the health and electoral sample.
*The first, second, etc. election refer to the number of constituencies within a district that have a man-woman election.
So 40% of districts have at least one constituency (seat) that was won in a man-woman election, 13% of districts have at least two, and so on. 
**The vote margins are ordered by absolute value in districts with more than one election and now first, second, etc. margin refer to the 
first, second etc constituency.
TABLE 1C DESCRIPTIVES
Unit of observation: village mean sd
Primary health subcentre 0.3517 0.4777
Primary health center 0.1418 0.3490
Community health centre 0.0815 0.2737
Government dispensary 0.1252 0.3310
Government hospital 0.0353 0.1846
Electricity 2.1797 0.6976
Post office 0.3755 0.4844
Telegraph 0.2015 0.4013
STD (telephone) booth 0.1958 0.3969
Bank 0.2831 0.4506
Observations 1558
Notes: Data from the village file of the National Family Health Survey, 1988/9, containing information on facilities at the time of the survey.
Summary statistics for the estimation sample for the infrastructure equations.
TABLE 2: BASELINE RESULTS
PANEL A Neonatal mortality
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
1 2 3 4 5 6
Fraction of seats in district won by female politicians -0.0050 -0.0148 -0.0303 -0.1176 -0.1942** -0.2061***
(women ) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.074) (0.079) (0.078)
District FE x x x
Cohort FE x x x x x x
Mother FE x x x
Controls x
Vote Margins 3rd order 3rd order 3rd order
polynomial polynomial polynomial
Observations 95,016 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498
Number of mothers 18,754 18,754
First Stage Regressions.Dependent variable: Fraction of seats in the district won by female politicians
1 2 3
Fraction of seats in district won by female politicians in close 0.8939*** 0.9011*** 0.8964***
elections against male politicians (womenclose ) (0.0714) (0.0785) (0.0789)
Fraction of seats in district that had close elections  -0.4303*** -0.4514*** -0.4495***
between female and male candidates (totalclose ) (0.0528) (0.0559) (0.0559)
F First Stage 156.27 131.6 129.1
PANEL B Infant mortality
OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
1 2 3 4 5 6
Fraction of seats in district won by female politicians 0.0081 0.0029 -0.0143 -0.0540 -0.1645 -0.1916*
(women ) (0.019) (0.022) (0.024) (0.098) (0.107) (0.104)
District FE x x x
Cohort FE x x x x x x
Mother FE x x x
Controls x
Vote Margins 3rd order 3rd order 3rd order
polynomial polynomial polynomial
Observations 91,169 68,665 68,665 68,665 68,665 68,665
Number of mothers 18,003 18,003
First Stage Regressions.Dependent variable: Fraction of seats in the district won by female politicians
1 2 3
Fraction of seats in district won by female politicians in close 0.9202*** 0.9302*** 0.9255***
elections against male politicians (womenclose ) (0.0671) (0.0744) (0.0752)
Fraction of seats in district that had close elections  -0.4575*** -0.4818*** -0.4797***
between female and male candidates (totalclose ) (0.0507) (0.0537) (0.0540)
F First Stage 187.6 156.3 151.3
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported between parentheses. * Significant at the 10%, ** significant at the 5%, *** significant at the 1%. The first columns (1 and 2)
show estimates with the full sample while subsequent columns show estimates for mothers with at least two births. Close elections are defined as elections in which the winner won against
the runner up by less than 3.5% of votes. All regressions include district and cohort fixed effects (FE); the third and fourth columns replace district FE with mother FE. Note that mother FE
include or imply district FE since mothers do not migrate across districts between births (by construction: this is investigated in section 5.2). All equations include state specific linear trends,
district specific trends are included in Table 3. Controls at the district level include the fraction of the district population that is female, urban and SC/ST and male and female literacy rates.
Controls at the individual level include dummy variables for gender, caste, religion, birth order, rural/urban location and for whether the birth is one of a multiple birth. All regressions shown
also include as a control the fraction of constituencies in the district that had close elections between women and men (totalclose).
TABLE 3: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
PANEL A Neonatal mortality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Fraction of seats in district won by female politicians -0.1473** -0.1902*** -0.1984*** -0.1969** -0.2616*** -0.2611*** -0.1422** -0.2289**
(0.070) (0.073) (0.073) (0.091) (0.088) (0.077) (0.072) (0.091)
Cohort FE x x x x x x x x
Mother FE x x x x x x x x
Controls x x x x x x x x
Margins no polynomial 1st ord pol 2nd ord pol. 3rd ord pol. 3rd ord pol. 3rd ord pol. 3rd ord pol. 3rd ord pol.
Robustness checks victory margin victory margin victory margin 2% 2.50% 3% 4% at least
one w-m ele
Observations 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498 29,979
Number of mothers 18,754 18,754 18,754 18,754 18,754 18,754 18,754 9,989
PANEL B Neonatal mortality
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Fraction of seats in district won by female politicians -0.1956** -0.2212** -0.2091*** -0.1886** -0.2001*** -0.2079** -0.1658** -0.1670**
(0.078) (0.086) (0.079) (0.076) (0.076) (0.082) (0.082) (0.080)
Cohort FE x x x x x x x x
Mother FE x x x x x x x
Controls x x x x x x x x
Margins 3rd ord pol. 3rd ord pol. 3rd ord pol. 3rd ord pol. 3rd ord pol. 3rd ord pol. 3rd ord pol. 3rd ord pol.
Robustness checks political outliers age mother mother cohort* quad trends state*birth year district district*mother 
controls FE child birth yr FE FE trends cohort FE
Observations 71,498 70,581 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498 71,498
Number of mothers 18,754 18,591 18,754 18,754 18,754 18,754 18,754
See Notes to Table 2. Here we show robustness checks on the specification in column 6 of Table 2. Columns 1-3 in Panel A vary the functional form for the constituency-level victory margins, columns 4-7 vary the
definition of close elections upwards and downwards from the baseline definition of a (constituency-level) vote margin that is less than 3.5%. Column 8 estimates the model on the sub-sample of districts that had at
least one election between a woman and a man. Column 1 in Panel B includes controls for the share of votes won by each of seven political parties (see the data appendix) and the share of seats reserved for the low
caste (SC/ST) population. Column 2 removes outliers in women (see the text). Columns 3 and 4 include increasingly flexible controls for mother's age at birth. Column 5 replaces linear with quadratic state trends,
column 6 with state*year dummies and column 7 adds district-specific cohort trends. Column 8 adds district-mother's birth year fixed effects.
Table 4: Timing of the effects and Falsification Exercise
Coefficient: Fraction of seats in the district won by female politicians
Child's age when politician was in power coeff se Child's age when politician was in power coeff se
-3 -0.0983 0.0900 4 -0.0114 0.0760
-2 -0.2257** 0.0990 5 0.0676 0.0700
-1 -0.2061*** 0.0780 6 0.0247 0.0860
0 -0.1975** 0.0840 7 0.0200 0.0860
1 -0.0417 0.0830 8 0.0410 0.0950
2 -0.0338 0.0820 9 -0.0801 0.0940
3 -0.0121 0.0810
Neonatal Mortality Neonatal Mortality
See Notes to Table 2. The baseline specification in column 6 of Table 2 uses the first lag (-1) of the gender mix of politicians at the district level because neonatal mortality is
largely determined by the foetal environment and birth conditions. That equation is re-estimated here without a lag to investigate the existence of contemporaneous effects and
with two additional lags. We also investigate leads (1 to 9) of politician gender as a placebo (see the text).
Table 5: Heterogeneity in Impact: Individual  Variables. Neonatal Mortality. 
PANEL A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Fraction of seats in district won by female politicians -0.2528* -0.0760 -0.1432* -0.5677** -0.2648* -0.1715 -0.1911
(women) (0.152) (0.081) (0.079) (0.253) (0.143) (0.160) (0.142)
Sample first child subsequent rural urban SC/ST OBC higher caste
children
Observations 18,562 52,936 56,273 15,225 21,827 23,134 26,537
Number of mothers 14,401 4,353 5,416 6,085 7,253
PANEL B 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fraction of seats in district won by female politicians -0.1469 -0.2199** -0.3228** -0.2050 -0.3366** -0.2458* -0.0703 -0.3494*** -0.1219
(women) (0.138) (0.112) (0.153) (0.156) (0.159) (0.143) (0.179) (0.131) (0.170)
Sample girls boys girls boys girls boys wealth bottom wealth mid wealth top
Control gender first gender first gender gender
child child siblings siblings 20% 40% 40%
Observations 27,886 31,871 17,025 18,699 17,025 18,699 19,217 30,823 20,558
Number of mothers 9,845 11,797 6,278 7,199 6,278 7,199 4,728 7,967 5,862
See notes to Table 2. The controls are those in the baseline model, col. 6 in Table 2. Columns in the top panel separate first and higher birth orders, rural and urban births, SC/ST, OBC, and higher caste births. In the bottom
panel the columns separate girls and boys, and births in households in the bottom 20% of the wealth distribution, the mid 40% and the top 40%. We do not use mother fixed effects in the first two columns since a mother has
only one first born child by definition.
Table 6: Heterogeneity in Impact: Political Variables. Neonatal Mortality. 
 Political characteristics 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fraction of seats in district won by female politicians -0.2043** -0.2241*** -0.2347** -0.1943** -0.1895** -0.2014** -0.2116** -0.2837***
(Women) (0.083) (0.079) (0.091) (0.079) (0.080) (0.081) (0.091) (0.109)
Women interacted with a dummy for years after 1993 -0.0118
(0.119)
Women interacted with political competition index 0.0597
(0.060)
Women interacted with dummy for female Chief Minister -0.8425***
(0.205)
Women belonging to the same party as the Chief Minister -0.2109**
(0.092)
Women belonging to a different party from the Chief Minister -0.1995**
(0.085)
Women interacted with turnout -0.0313
(0.066)
Women interacted with female turnout -0.0355
(0.074)
Women interacted with female/male turnout ratio -0.0265
(0.080)
Women interacted with newspaper circulation -0.1310
(0.205)
Women interacted with newspaper circulation English 0.0199
(0.119)
Women interacted with newspaper circulation Hindi 0.1390
(0.214)
Women interacted with newspaper circulation Regional -0.1547
(0.291)
P value joint significance of Women and interacted terms 0.0255 0.0162 0.000 0.0468 0.0095 0.0378 0.0568 0.0731
Observations 71,498 71,498 52,474 71,498 71,498 69,306 69,306 69,507 52,644
Number of mothers 18,754 18,754 15,664 18,754 18,754 18,589 18,589 18,258 15,639
See notes to Table 2. The controls are those in the baseline model, col. 6 in Table 2. In column 1 we interact a post-1993 dummy with the variable of interest (women). In column 2 we interact the variable of interest with the
Besley & Burgess (2002) index of political competition. In column 3 we interact the variable of interest with a dummy for whether the Chief Minister was a woman. In column 4 we create variables denoting the share of female
politicians that do and do not belong to the same political party as the Chied Minister. In columns 5, 6 and 7 we interact with turnout, female turnout and the ratio of male to female turnout. In column 8 we interact with
newspaper circulation (Besley and Burgess 2002) and in column 9 we interact with newspaper circulation by language (Besley and Burgess 2002). Political competition, turnout and newspaper circulation are converted to z-
scores before they are included in the model.
TABLE 7: Health Seeking Behaviours
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Panel A
Fraction of seats in district won by female politicians 3.6524** 2.7745* 1.0663*** 0.9518** 0.1798 0.3113 1.2758*** 1.3406**
(women) (1.783) (1.662) (0.364) (0.429) (0.320) (0.376) (0.462) (0.535)
District FE x x x x x x x x
Cohort FE x x x x x x x x
Mother Group FE x x x x
F first stage 155.001 124.482 164.951 131.19 164.401 130.846 167.418 132.767
Observations 7,448 7,448 8,429 8,429 8,383 8,383 8,062 8,062
1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel B
Fraction of seats in district won by female politicians -0.8698** -0.8768* 1.0344*** 1.0904*** -0.1646 -0.2136
(women) (0.433) (0.522) (0.346) (0.394) (0.344) (0.350)
District FE x x x x x x
Cohort FE x x x x x x
Mother Group FE x x x
F first stage 164.382 130.572 164.382 130.572 164.382 130.572
Observations 8,408 8,408 8,408 8,408 8,408 8,408
Breastfed first 24 hrs
Delivery at home
Number of antenatal visits
Delivery gov. institution Delivery priv. institution
Iron & folic supplements Tetanus injection in preg.
See Notes to Table 2. As in Table 2, women is instrumented with womenclose. Means of the dependent variables are in Table 1. Mother group FE are defined in the text, they are FE
defined over multiple dimensions of mother-level observables.
TABLE 8: Village Public Goods
PANEL A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Primary Primary Community Government Government
VARIABLES Health Subcentre Health Centre Health Centre Dispensary Hospital
Fraction of seats in district won by female politicians 3.4769 2.2365** 1.8871** 1.7857** 0.5682*
(women) (2.215) (1.120) (0.849) (0.900) (0.311)
Year dummies x x x x x
District dummies x x x x x
Observations 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558
R squared 0.326 0.342 0.354 0.370 0.210
PANEL B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Electricity Bank Post Telegraph STD (Telephone)
VARIABLES Office Booth
Fraction of seats in district won by female politicians 0.9865 -2.4616* -2.1704 0.6037 -0.9293
(women) (1.225) (1.494) (2.218) (1.241) (1.589)
Year dummies x x x x x
District dummies x x x x x
Observations 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558
R squared 0.455 0.280 0.306 0.231 0.238
See Notes to Table 2. As in Table 2, women is instrumented with womenclose. All regressions include districts and year dummies and population
controls. The means of the dependent variables are in Table 1. The F-statistic of the first stage regressions is 45.973.
